This paper first discusses the past patterns of the national medical care expenditure and its future path. About 30 percent of the past growth was due to population aging and the remaining 70 percent was due to technological change. The medical expenditure is expected to increase by about 20 percent in 20 years due to population aging.
Introduction
Japanese citizens have recently worried about the rising burden of medical costs.
Frequent reports of medical malpractice and accidents indicate, however, that the quality of medical services does not match the rising bill. This paper aims to discuss how Japanese policy makers could control the cost and quality of medical services. To this end, the paper first examines the past behavior of the national medical care expenditure and its future path. Possible reforms to slush medical costs and improve the quality of medical care are then proposed.
Per capita real medical expenditure is driven by two factors; a change in the population structure and the so-called "natural increase" (a change in input due to technological change). Section 2 of this paper shows that about 30 percent of the past growth was due to population aging and the remaining 70 percent was due to technological change. The paper also surveys the effect of population aging on future medical care expenditure and finds that medical expenditure will increase by around 20 percent in 20 years due to population aging.
Section 3 focuses on a reform of health insurance for the elderly and presents some policy recommendations. From the time the government started working on a fundamental reform plan of public health insurance, it took officials a very long time to assemble a reform plan of health insurance for the elderly. After failing to meet a deadline twice, the government and ruling parties finally reached an agreement of health care reform in November 2001. The agreed plan, however, has not resolved some fundamental problems. One of the most serious unresolved problems is that virtually no agents in the health care market evaluate the quality of medical services or help to improve it. It has not been clarified whether the rising medical costs are the result of waste or of necessity. Reforms should attempt to make insurers play a more active role in the health care market as informed agents of patients. Since the public sector has been dominating the health insurance business, dramatic outsourcing of the health insurance business to the private sector should be promoted.
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The Effect of Aging on Medical Costs

Past Experiences
The national medical expenditure in 2000 was 3,036 billion yen, and a Japanese citizen spent an average of 239 thousand yen a year for medical care. As shown in Figure 1 , the ratio of medical expenditure to GDP increased in the 1990s and reached 6.3 percent in 1999.
1 Since the share of medical expenditure of the elderly has been growing, many people think that the aging of population is a major reason for the increasing medical costs. However, focusing only on population aging will result in overlooking another important source. Even if the ratio of the elderly population to the total population remains stable, the overall growth of medical expenditure, including the non-elderly, is possible.
To determine the importance of the role of population aging in the increase in medical costs, Table 1 summarizes information from publications of the Ministry of Health,
Labor, and Welfare and shows that the real per capita medical expenditure grew at a rate of 4.5 percent per annum from 1980 to 1999. The contribution of population aging is obtained by changing only the population structure keeping the medical cost of each age group constant. The annual growth rate that is attributed to the change in the population structure was 1.4 percent from 1980 to 1997. Population aging increased the real per capita medical cost by 27 percent during this period. Therefore, about 30 percent of the medical cost growth is due to population aging. The "residual" growth (3.1 percent per annum) is attributed to a change in medical technology. Niki (1995) . For example, Cutler (1997) and Newhouse (1992) pointed out that the contribution of the change in the population structure in the United States 1 The medical care expenditure slightly decreased in 2000 due to the introduction of the public long-term care insurance. Before then a non-negligible part of population with disabilities had substituted medical services provided by health insurance for long-term care services. However, other data sources indicate that the upward trend of medical care costs has not qualitatively changed since 2000. Although resources devoted to both medical care and long-term care should be a focus of health policy for the elderly, issues in long-term care costs are beyond the scope of this paper. 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Fiscal Year % 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Source: National Medical Care Expenditure, various issues, Ministry of Labor, Health and Welfare. Note: The medical cost of those aged 15-44 for each year is normalized to be one.
-3 -was much smaller. 2 Thirdly, the impact of aging became bigger in a later period. Since population aging in Japan is expected to accelerate in the near future, the attention needs to be paid to the future consequences. 
Future Projections
If the elderly continue to incur higher medical costs than the non-elderly, the increasing aging population will raise the per capita medical costs of the entire population.
The Since economists prefer a projection based on real costs, many alternative studies of estimating real medical costs have been conducted (for example, Iwamoto, Takeshita and Bessho, 1997; Niki, 1995; Nishimura, 1997; Ogura, 1994; Ogura and Irifune, 1990; Tokita et al. 1997) . To estimate the real expenditure, it is necessary to predict what the inflation rate and technological change will be in the future. 4 A conservative approach to predicting the future inflation rate of medical services is to assume it will be the same with the overall inflation rate. A more difficult problem is how to predict the future growth of medical service input. A naive assumption is that the real medical service input is proportional to the real income. When we combine these assumptions, the nominal medical costs for an average person are proportional to the nominal income.
The effect of aging population is then isolated as follows. Take the recent data of medical costs of various age groups. Change only the population data to the projected future value (the government projection is commonly used). The total medical costs are the product of the per capita medical cost and the medical costs of an average person.
Since the growth rate of the latter is equal to the income growth rate, the growth rate of the former reflects the change in the ratio of total medical expenditure to the income.
When we focus on this ratio, we do not have to specify either the inflation rate or income growth rate. Table 2 summarizes the existing research, which calculated the future medical costs using the above-mentioned approach. These studies show quite a similar pattern. For projections in the early 21st century, Ogura and Irifune (1990) and 2020 was estimated as 22.7 percent by Nishimura (1997) and 19 percent by Tokita et al. (1997) . A rough consensus is that the national medical expenditure will grow by about 20 percent in the first 20 years of this century. 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are normalized so that the bese year has 100. Medical costs per capita of Ogura and Irifune (1990) , Ogura (1995) , Nishimura (1997) , Tokita et al. (1997) , total medical costs of Niki (1995) and Iwamoto, Takeshita and Bessho (1997) , and case (B) of Iwamoto, Takeshita, and Bessho (1997) are the author's calculation. Ogura and Irifune (1990) and Ogura (1995) relied on their own population projections. Case (B) of Iwamoto, Takeshita and Bessho (1997) relied on the official population projection as with January 1997. Other studies employed the official population projection as with September 1992.
Debates on a Comprehensive Reform of the Health Insurance for the Elderly
Reform Debates Entangled
Since the growth rate of medical expenditure has exceeded that of the national income, the financial condition of health insurance system has continuously deteriorated.
The necessity of a comprehensive reform of the health insurance system has been recognized since the Medical Insurance Council of the former Ministry of Health and Welfare commenced a discussion in March 1995. The toughest problem to be tackled is how to finance the medical costs of the elderly, who spend much more and contribute less than other sectors of the population.
Under the current system, workers and their families are enrolled in Employee's Health Insurance (EHI), and retired workers and their families belong to the National Health Insurance (NHI), which is mainly for the self-employed and the elderly. If the NHI tries to maintain an independent budget, its financial situation will seriously worsen. The government, then, is forced to subsidize the NHI. When the Health Service for the Elderly (Roken in Japanese) was established in 1983, the financing scheme of the medical costs of the elderly was fundamentally changed. First of all, the Roken is in a unique position because it is responsible for only the provision of benefits, while other health insurance subsystems are responsible for both the provision of benefits and the collection of insurance premiums. After the establishment of the Roken, the elderly remain enrollees of existing systems, which they pay premiums, but they receive benefits from the Roken. The Roken itself does not collect a premium. The medical costs of the elderly are financed from transfers from other health insurance groups. Roughly speaking, each subsystem pays to the Roken in proportion to the number of their enrollees. 5 The medical costs of the elderly are effectively supported by the rest of the public health insurance subsystems. However, the EHI is not pleased to have to subsidize the Roken. The increased share of medical costs of the elderly has caused a substantial increase in transfers from other insurance groups, thus worsening the financial conditions of the EHI. . 7 The idea of the cap system, which was unpopular with doctors, was dropped from the plan.
What went wrong?
The agreed reform plan is a mismatch of compromises. It partially incorporates the first candidate of the March 2001 report by increasing the subsidies by the national budget. It also partially incorporates the second candidate of the report by moving retired workers aged 70-74 and their dependents to the Taishokusha Iryo, which is effectively a part of health insurance for employees. 8 The agreed reform plan does not
give a final answer of how to finance the medical costs of the elderly. Neither does it solve the problem of the increasing medical costs. Therefore, another reform will be needed within a few years if medical costs continue to grow.
The large delay of the overhaul of the health care system comes from addressing the problems in the wrong order. Since the total medical expenditure is not likely to be changed substantially by the current reform plan, reducing somebody's burden will increase somebody else's. The finance of health insurance is essentially a zero sum game. While a cap system will automatically cut expenses, its effect on the quality of medical service is ambiguous. Since Japan has virtually no workable quality evaluation system, there is no guarantee that the cap system will cut only inefficient medical treatments. Moreover, we will not be able to check whether the quality of the medical services will stay the same or decline. The problem that should be addressed first is how to make the provision system more transparent and efficient. Until people are convinced of the quality of medical services, a satisfactory fundamental reform of health insurance will not be realized.
The consumer's demand for better and cheaper services is not different between the health care market and other markets. In the market economy, usually, consumer choice puts pressure upon providers, thus resulting in the improvement of quality and the reduction of prices. However, due to asymmetric information, consumer sovereignty has not been well established in the area of health care. A promising idea to remedy the absence of consumer sovereignty is to have a professional third party acting as an informed agent for patients. Managed care belongs to this idea; an insurer plays a more active role than in traditional insurance policies.
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A naive application of managed care will not be workable in Japan because a dominant part of health insurance is operated by the public sector, which is not supposed to become a driving force of the market mechanism. Japanese regulators have basically given up measuring the quality, and they have targeted the ratio of medical expenditure to the national income. As a result, the actions of improving the quality of services in Japan lag far behind those of the United States, where private companies run health insurance business. Our government has just started promoting Evidence-Based
Medicine, which has already been incorporated into medical practices outside Japan.
The Japanese Way of Promoting Managed Care
Providers of medical services have not received a strong market force under the dominance of the public health insurance system. 10 Therefore, our health policy has to outsource a substantial part of the public health insurance business to the private sector (2000) surveys issues in managed care. 10 Japanese medical expenses vary widely among regions. The prefecture with the highest per capita medical costs spent 1.53 times as much as the prefecture with the lowest cost in 1999, even after adjusting for the difference in the population structure. The large regional variations have been considered as evidence that Japanese medical practices are not quite standardized. A recent report of the regional variations has pointed out that the excess capacity of medical institutions drives medical costs up by inducing the demand for medical care (Chiikisa Kenkyukai, 2001 ).
insurer will also be able to make a contact directly with medical service providers and apply a different payment schedule from that determined by the public health insurance.
When the reform actions advocated by the Reform Work Schedule are realized, the insurer will be given an opportunity to play a more active role in the health care market.
Particularly, the design of a payment schedule will play an important role in improving the medical practice. The introduction of a prospective payment system (PPS) has been advocated in the reform of payment schedule because the insurer will evaluate the quality of providers and give them incentives through the reward based upon outcome rather than input.
In 1990, the public health insurance first introduced a PPS into the inpatient fee of the elderly. The PPS was later introduced into other areas at a slow pace. What will be the consequence of the PPS? If medical service providers seek profit, the introduction of the PPS will result in a lower service input. Its effect on quality would be ambiguous, when the original fee-for-service payment distorts the behavior of providers. An early study of the consequences of the introduction of the PPS in 1990 is Takagi (1993) , which provides a case study of a hospital. A comparison before and after the introduction of the PPS indicated that the hospital had substantially reduced the utilization of drugs and screening. In terms of the numbers of deaths at the hospital, the quality of medical services did not show a significant decline.
An important difference from the US Medicare PPS is that Japanese providers choose the PPS or a fee-for-service schedule. While the choice cannot be given on a case-by-case basis, the providers will choose the PPS if the expected revenue under the PPS is higher than those under the fee-for-service schedule. Kawai and Maruyama (2000) focused on the introduction of PPS to outpatient care for chronic diseases of the elderly and outpatient care for infant children in April 1996, and they found that providers respond to incentives given by the PPS. A hospital that expected a lower average medical cost under the fee-for-service schedule would choose PPS. Since policy makers intended to involve many medical care providers in the PPS, the payments under the PPS became generous for hospitals that spend less resources on patients.
Therefore, the PPS was not helpful in reducing medical costs. The mandatory application of PPS has to be considered as a policy option.
Concluding Remarks
To determine whether medical costs can be cut without deteriorating the quality and how to do so, we need to have a satisfactory system to evaluate the quality of medical care. Thus creation of a workable evaluation system should be given top priority.
A market-oriented approach, competition trough a choice by informed agents of patients will help to improve the efficiency of health care provision. The public operation of health insurance has deprived the vital activities of the private sector. The introduction of managed care into the world governed by publicly operated universal health insurance will require a different strategy from that needed in a world dominated by private health insurance. Therefore, a naive imitation of US experiences may not be workable, and the Japanese policy makers will have to design a system that fits the Japanese situation. The provision and financing of health care varies among countries.
The ongoing Japanese experience will help us understand the interaction of the market and institutions more thoroughly.
In policy debates, a totally ignored issue is whether we have to pre-fund the health insurance against the expected rise of future medical expenses; some academic scholars, however, have discussed it (Iwamoto, 2002; Nishimura, 1997; and Suzuki, 2000) . Since
we have more problems to address than problems resolved, continued effort will be necessary to pursue a better health policy.
